Troubled Times Ahead with New
Anti-Terror Legislation
By Matthew Behrens
Just
in time for an election campaign in which Stephen Harper is positioning himself
as a wartime Prime Minister, Bill C-51 (Anti-Terrorism
Act 2015) was recently introduced to play a dual role: granting
extraordinary new powers to already hyperactive and unaccountable state
security agencies, and baiting as “soft on terror” anyone who questions the
bill’s necessity and the human rights violations it will further legitimize.
Harper
started off 2015 by claiming “jihadists” had “declared war” on Canada, later adding a
line from the George W. Bush playbook: “They
want to harm us because they hate our society and the values it
represents.” (One thing Harper and
others have yet to address is why so-called “jihadists” have not declared war
on democracies like Brazil, Argentina, or Costa Rica, which have similar
“values,” not to mention vibrant celebrations of hedonistic sexuality that
might make ISIS cringe.)
SETTING THE STAGE
Introducing
C-51, Harper declared “violent jihadism…is not a human right. It is an act of
war, and our government's new legislation fully understands that difference.” Even though one of the RCMP’s own internal documents advises
against using terms like “jihadism” and “Islamic terrorism” – based on the understanding
that “distorted and inflammatory linkages between Islam and terrorism” succeed
only in “conflating terrorism with mainstream Islam, thereby casting all
Muslims as terrorists or potential terrorists” – Harper refuses
to respect those cautions, going so far as to slanderously suggest that mosques are terrorism incubators.
The bill’s
introduction on a Friday afternoon was stage managed to take advantage of a
series of planned events: the start of
two terror-related trials the following Monday (the “BC pressure cooker” and
the “Toronto Via Rail” plots) and the subsequent arrest of 25-year-old Awso
Peshdary for allegedly helping young men travel overseas to fight in Syria. The
Mounties held a press conference to report the arrest of Peshdary, who has been
under surveillance for five years and posed no imminent threat, and also to suddenly
announce two warrants for overseas fighters who have long been in the news.
Taken together, things were perfectly timed to produce a cascading mirage that
Canada was, as Harper said, under attack.
Following the Mounties’ press conference, Public Safety Minister
Steven Blaney commended the men and women in uniform and added his own lines to
this well-scripted melodrama: “Our Government is confronting the
terrorist threat at home and has introduced the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015 to give our law enforcement and national security agencies the tools
they need to protect Canadians against these ever-evolving threats.”
Against this
backdrop, the Liberals cowardly caved
and announced they would support the bill even before it was studied in the
House of Commons. A wary NDP expressed tepid opposition, with only Elizabeth May calling it what it is: “The Act to Create a New Secret Police.”
In reality, Bill C-51 does not create a secret police so much as
it further entrenches what has been Standard Operating Procedure for Canada’s secret
security agencies for years. That secretive netherworld of deliberate
deception, complicity in torture, refusal to respect court orders, surveillance,
harassment, racial and religious profiling, and a complete lack of
accountability will, with C-51, benefit from a massive bulking up of very
dangerous powers. It will also invite the Canadian courts to approve dirty
tricks and illegal acts, and provide immunity to those whose “good faith”
actions break the law and abuse human rights in acts that may constitute
torture.
The sheer size of the 63-page bill prevents as detailed an
analysis as one might like in this space, so what follows is a broad overview
of some key provisions and concerns.
WHO WILL BE TARGETED?
In the initial flurry of C-51 coverage, much focus has been
devoted to the potential restraints on speech, advocacy, and the media. The
bill’s overly broad, vague terminology – the term “terrorist offences in
general” could capture just about any activity – could, for example, be used
against a journalist interviewing a Taliban commander or a columnist who urges
anti-Russian forces in Ukraine to blow up oil refineries. Frightening as the chilling effect of these provisions
will be, it is perhaps helpful to remind ourselves that like its antecedent,
the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, this bill will be used to continue targeting,
disrupting, and roughing up very specific and often marginalized communities.
Among those are indigenous rights activists, Arab Muslims and those perceived
as such, refugees and immigrants, and those who quite rightly have concluded
that the only way to initiate meaningful social change in this country is to operate
outside the boundaries of “acceptable” legal definitions of protest and
resistance.
Even though the
government must know that sections of its legislation may eventually fall
victim to a Charter of Rights and Freedoms court challenge, Bill C-51 will nonetheless
be a hugely effective tool of repression and control. The mere possibility of charges
being laid will have a major chilling effect on whole communities and,
especially, community media outlets that might report on home country conflicts
in a manner that might conflict with Canada’s foreign policy objectives. There
is certainly precedent for this concern. As the
International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group reported in a 2003 report, In the Shadow of the Law, there had been
“hundreds” of instances where people in Canada “are being visited for
interviews by security forces without warrants, and taken away for
interrogation. Although the full extent of Bill C-36 [so-called
"anti-terror" legislation hurriedly passed by Parliament in 2001] was
not implemented in these cases, it has been used as a threat to ‘encourage’
voluntary interviews by citing the risk of preventative detention allowed under
the Act. Victims of such police conduct have been afraid to come forward
publicly for fear of further retaliation.”
In activist circles, Bill C-51 may spur self-censorship even when
it comes to theoretical discussions of railroad blockades, sabotage of
pipelines, life-affirming property destruction (such as the dismantling of a
CF-18 bomber on display at a war show), and actions designed to disrupt
business as usual in the Canadian economy.
The communication section of C-51 is so alarming that even a state
security academic who supports
preventive detention, Craig
Forcese, has coauthored with his colleague Kent Roach a 10,000-word critique that outlines the serious issues raised by
this section. The law professors explore a wide variety of scenarios under
which individuals may be charged, the lack of statutory defences allowed, and
the lower threshold in language that has evolved from “will” engage in
nefarious activities (which implies a probability) to “may” (a mere
possibility). They also note that unlike hate speech provisions, Bill C-51
appears to apply not just to public speech, but also to private communications
that are recorded by security agencies. Ironically, this section may also
hinder police investigation of potential threats, given that it could lead to
the shutdown of online chat rooms where those likely to engage in violence are
sometimes first spotted by investigators.
Those who attend and film demonstrations may also be at risk given
the section that defines terrorist propaganda as “any writing, sign, visible
representation or audio recording that advocates or promotes the commission of
terrorism offences in general…or counsels the commission of a terrorism
offence.” Given that some Palestinians are represented by a government considered
terrorist by Canada (Hamas), will signs declaring “I support Hamas” make one
culpable, along with the video images of them? Will the provision of
information in Canada about contributing material aid to Gaza medical clinics
or schools be viewed as such propaganda?
Bill
C-51 also authorizes seizure of “terrorist propaganda,” a wide-open concept
likely to be enforced against a broad range of political materials with the
same zeal that lesbian and gay magazines and books were regularly held up at the
US border under obscenity laws. Notably, the Anarchist Cookbook, freely available
at amazon.com, was nonetheless used in a recent Toronto “terror” prosecution as
a damning piece of evidence when it was found on a suspect’s flash drive.
Communications restrictions appear to be based on the theory that
exposure to certain images and ideas on the internet leads to violence, but the
Canadian government has yet to show any substantive, causal link. As University
of Chicago researcher David Benson argued last year
in Security Studies, “Although access to the Internet has increased across the globe, there has
been no corresponding increase in completed transnational terrorist attacks…the
Internet is not a force multiplier for transnational terrorist organizations.”
“UNDERMINING THE SECURITY OF CANADA”
This
might be called the Gandhi clause, since it speaks to any “interference”
related to government operations including “intelligence, defence, border
operations, public safety, the administration of justice, diplomatic or consular
relations, or the economic or financial stability of Canada.” Under this
absurdly broad definition, those facing possible charges could include
organizers of a national day of action that involves economic targets, nonviolent
railway blockages, freeway occupations, or sit-ins that stop business as usual
in government offices. It could include a blockade of the U.S. embassy to
protest continued operation of the torture camp in Guantanamo Bay, encouraging
people across the country to refuse to speak with CSIS agents, or urging Muslim
groups to end the odious practice of hosting the Mounties at Ramadan
celebrations.
Indeed, this section of C-51 could also capture any form of civil
disobedience with the perceived aim of “changing or unduly influencing a government
in Canada by force or unlawful means.” This is also a Gandhi clause inasmuch as
his concept of satyagraha, or soul-force, did exactly that, through mass acts
of nonviolent direct action that challenged the British salt monopoly and
overall colonial control of India. Also
targetted are hackers, those who would interfere with “the global information infrastructure.”
It is ironic that Anonymous, likely one of the targets of this bill, did in one
afternoon last week what governments have never been able (or wanted) to do:
shut down ISIS twitter and facebook feeds.
Furthermore, human rights campaigners concerned with ending the
overseas abuses of Canadian mining companies, or those sailing a ship to bring
medical supplies to Gaza, may fall under the clauses that covers “an activity
that takes place in Canada and undermines the security of another state.” More
specifically, this clause appears directed at the Boycott, Divestment, and
Sanctions movement which seeks to end the illegal Israeli occupation of
Palestinian lands. Notably, just last month, Canada and Israel signed a memorandum of understanding that addressed this very issue, committing to stop any criticism
of Israel’s brutal human rights abuses.
Like
its predecessor in 2001, C-51 takes pains to point out that “it does not
include lawful advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression,” but such
reassurance is meaningless when state security agencies have no concept of what
“lawful” means. For example, CSIS and
the RCMP were recently caught out playing an active role infiltrating and monitoring anti-pipeline groups. The agencies
shared their findings with the oil industry and the National Energy Board,
before whom many environmentalists and First Nations were set to testify
regarding their concerns over the proposed Northern Gateway pipeline.
INFORMATION SHARING
Freeing government agencies to
share even more private, personal information will only result in further
abuses of power. For example, anyone who calls 911 for feeling suicidal can
forget about crossing the U.S. border. All such
Canadian police information goes into a shared database with U.S. officials,
who have stopped Canadians suffering from depression from entering the U.S. on at
least four occasions.
Furthermore, the potential for misuse or unauthorized use of
information shared between government agencies is ever-present, for nothing in
the bill prevents the recipient of personal information from, “in accordance
with the law, using that information, or further disclosing it to any person, for
any purpose.” And while such information sharing has led to the torture of
Canadians (for which no government official has ever been held accountable or
charged), C-51 proposes that individuals misusing or improperly passing along
personal information enjoy blanket immunity, for “No civil proceedings lie
against any person for their disclosure in good faith of information under this
Act.”
While the principle underlying this section is that “effective and
responsible information sharing protects Canada and Canadians,” that was the
exact language used by retired judge Frank Iacobucci when he defended the
actions of those who created and then shared inflammatory and false accusations that led to the torture of
Canadians Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad
El Maati, and Muayyed Nureddin. (Indeed, Iacobucci believed such government individuals
tried, in good faith, to “carry out conscientiously the duties and
responsibilities of the institutions of which they were a part,” even though
they were sending questions to Syrian and Egyptian torturers.)
Meanwhile,
the free flow of information amongst a wider circle of agencies brings the Canada
Revenue Agency into the picture with changes to the Excise Tax Act and the Customs
Act. Despite the bureaucratese of this section, there is clear danger: under
changes to the Income Tax Act, an
official may provide to another government institution “taxpayer information,
if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the information would be
relevant to” a national security investigation. In a climate dominated by the politically
motivated targeting of certain charities, this means that someone who received
a Canada Revenue tax receipt for contributing money to the recently banned humanitarian
organization IRFAN might have a CSIS agent knocking on their door to ask
questions. This will seriously affect mosques and NGOs that work in troubled
hot spots, and create fear among potential donors.
Part of the danger here involves the fact that the government
often holds inaccurate information without an individual’s knowledge or
consent. For example, FINTRAC, Canada’s “financial intelligence” unit, holds over
165 million files with Canadians’ personal information. Among its extensive
holdings are the agency’s Terrorist Property Reports (TPRs), which allege
certain properties in or outside Canada are owned or controlled by terrorists.
Almost 50% of those reports have been filed on the basis of a “possible match”
to terrorist listings.
Disturbingly, according to a 2013 report from the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada, “Where identity could not be confirmed, FINTRAC did not
pursue further analysis; however, the information remained in FINTRAC’s
database. The practice, by default, was to retain these reports regardless of
whether or not there was knowledge, belief, or suspicion of terrorist
affiliation.” The Privacy Commissioner found that FINTRAC continues to collect
information that goes beyond its mandate, and refuses to destroy these
extraneous files, thus posing “a significant risk to privacy by making
accessible information which should never have been obtained.” In other words, a Muslim cleric who runs a rural
summer camp – perhaps anonymously reported but never confirmed as a terrorist
property – stays in a database that is shared with CBSA, CSIS, and the RCMP,
with utterly predictable consequences for that individual as well as anyone who
regularly attends his mosque.
NO FLY LIST
Canada has long had a no-fly list, the so-called Passenger Protect
Program, but it did not arise out of a specific piece of legislation that was
subject to Parliamentary debate. With C-51, the no-fly list officially becomes entrenched
in law as The Secure Air Travel Act, with
a legal infrastructure that inherits much of the same machinery that has undergirded
the secret trial security certificate regime. Being included on the list is courtesy
of the lowest standard of proof available (reasonable grounds to believe), and
while this information will be shared with Canadian agencies, the Minister of
Public Safety may also share this “with
the government of a foreign state, an institution of such a government or an international
organization.” This means the secret police of Egypt or Syria, for example,
upon hearing “Ahmad in Canada” is now on the list, may use this national
security suspicion to investigate, harass, detain, interrogate, and torture his
family members in that country, perhaps as a means of punishing “Ahmad in
Canada” for refusing to spy on his community for CSIS. This is in fact exactly
what happened to the overseas relatives of numerous Egyptian-born security certificate
detainees in Canada.
Appealing placement on the
no-fly list is as futile an exercise as trying to defend oneself under security
certificates. The process is largely secret and the judge may receive into evidence
anything, “even if it is inadmissible in a court of law, and may base a
decision on that evidence.” As with security certificate cases, someone in a
no-fly case is no longer in a court of law, and a judge’s final decision may be
based on anything, even if “a summary of that information or other evidence has
not been provided to” the person on the no-fly list. The concerns originally submitted
in 2007 by the National Council of Canadian Muslim’s predecessor organization continue
to apply to the new legislation (see their report Too Guilty to Fly, Too Innocent to Charge?).
In
addition, while Bill C-51 empowers the government to take away passports, seize
computers and documents, and prevent individuals from boarding airplanes, it
also authorizes law-breaking and immunity
for possibly illegal acts. Indeed, any act or omission required in enforcing
the Act will not result in charges even if it “would otherwise constitute a
contravention of this Act or its regulations.”
TERRORIST PEACE BONDS
These
repressive measures, part of the 2001 Act, allow the government to arrest and
detain someone without a warrant or charge when there are “reasonable grounds”
to fear a terrorism offence “will” occur, with an option of release under
conditions that may include house arrest, electronic monitoring, and more. Under
C-51, the threshold for arrest has been lowered to “may”, as has the language
used to describe the effect of a peace bond, which will go from “necessary” to
prevent the offence to “likely” to prevent. The bond will last for up to 12
months, and any detainee who cannot or will not to enter into such an
agreement, will face a similar amount of time in prison. Persons with previous
terrorism convictions will face longer periods under peace bonds or in jail (up
to 5 years). Similarly, such orders will continue to be made available against
young people under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, imposing conditions on
teenagers or jailing them for 30 days.
DISRUPTION, COURT-ORDERED TORTURE
Changes to the CSIS Act will allow the agency for the very first
time to take on policing roles under which they are allowed to “take measures,
within or outside Canada, to reduce the threat” of any act they have reasonable
grounds to believe is a security risk. While they are allowed to do anything as
long as it presumably complies with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (a
caution the agency regularly ignores to begin with), if they feel the need to
rough someone up and violate their rights in the process, they can go ahead and
play Jack Bauer from the U.S. torture glorification TV series, 24. Indeed, CSIS is being allowed here
to undertake certain measures in a manner “contrary to other Canadian law” if
they are “authorized to take them by a warrant.” In plain English, this opens
the door to courts approving illegal acts.
The language of this section recalls the bone-chilling
justification of torture by former White House counsel John Yoo (who advised “cruel,
inhuman, or degrading” treatment is not torture, and the threshold for
something to be deemed torture must be “serious physical injury, such as organ
failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death”). Under C-51, CSIS is provided a lot of room for cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment when they are advised that in the process of their
terror plot disruption, they cannot intentionally
or through negligence cause “death or bodily harm to an individual,” a very vague
statement when intentionality is factored in. (Bodily harm is defined as “any hurt or injury to a person that interferes with the health or comfort
of the person and that is more than merely transient or trifling in nature.”) CSIS cannot be held responsible, therefore,
if someone in their custody “accidentally” falls out of a helicopter or 6th
floor window, as often happens in police states.
In addition, CSIS agents cannot “willfully attempt in any manner
to obstruct, pervert, or defeat the course of justice” (which implies they can
do these acts as long as they are not willful in doing so). Nor can they “violate
the sexual integrity of an individual” (even though that’s already standard
practice at police stations from Northern BC to Abu
Ghraib). An important question arises herein: if the Canadian government actually
feels the need to spell out such a prohibition, what does it know about illicit
CSIS practices behind closed doors that would lead it to include such bold wording?
CSIS is also
authorized to violate the national sovereignty of other nations and commit
illegal acts abroad, with C-51 noting that “without regard to any other law,
including that of any foreign state, a judge may, in a warrant issued [under
these circumstances], authorize the measures specified in it to be taken
outside Canada.” Such measures include breaking and entering, theft of documents
“or any other thing,” installation, maintenance or removal “of any thing” (i.e.,
eavesdropping devices), and “any other thing that is reasonably necessary to
take those measures.”
Those who believe the courts of Canada might be wary of approving
such warrants may wish to recall that, as the Globe and Mail reported, “between 1993 and 2003, CSIS filed warrant
applications at a rate of between 200 and 300 a year for a total of 2,544
applications [a less than 1% rejection rate]. Only 18 of these requests were
rejected by the Federal Court.”
MORE SECRET CLOSED-DOOR HEARINGS
As if things were not difficult enough for those detained under secret
hearing security certificates, even the questionable “improvement” made to what Amnesty
International has called a fundamentally flawed and unfair process – the
introduction of security-cleared “special advocates” who can see and argue some
of the case behind closed doors – is targeted under C-51. Also further undermined is the ability of any
refugee who has been declared inadmissible to Canada to properly meet the
alleged case against them.
In a classic case of stacking the deck, C-51 proposes that when a security
certificate is first signed, the Minister may now file with the court evidence
“that is relevant to the ground of
inadmissibility stated in the certificate.” Translated, this means that the
whole case file will NOT be included, but only that which, in the already
biased Minister’s opinion, is “relevant,” thereby excluding information which
may exonerate the detainee. It is just
such exonerating information that special advocates have been able to uncover
in a couple of these controversial cases, and ever since, every effort has been
made to further weaken the already limited powers of the advocates. An
additional clause would allow the Minister to be exempted even from sharing
with the special advocate the entirety of the now limited file that was
provided in secret to the judge.
In addition, the government will win the right to object at any
stage of the process when something that was formerly secret is considered safe
enough to share with the detainee. These appeals will suspend proceedings and
seriously bog down the already extensive process, lengthening the amount of
time an individual must remain behind bars or under house arrest. That same
right of immediate and unquestioned government appeal of disclosure decisions
(without even requiring what is known as “an application for leave”) will also
apply to refugees at Immigration Appeal Division hearings, detention reviews,
admissibility hearings, and judicial reviews.
WHAT TO DO?
In the short term, groups are actively working to testify before
Parliamentary hearings, and while this will be an important public education
effort, the bill is likely to pass with Conservative and Liberal support.
Hopefully, debate around C-51 will go beyond demands for state security oversight
(long called for by the O’Connor Inquiry, which condemned Canadian complicity
in the torture of Maher Arar) to address a much broader concern: Canada’s state
security agencies already have a lengthy track record of violating the law,
lying to the Courts, misleading the public and Parliament, and refusing the
recommendations of the extremely limited review committees which currently investigate
their “excesses.”
Short of the the abolition
of CSIS and its brother agencies (a worthy goal, calls for which would possibly
violate C-51), a much firmer hand needs to be applied to rein them in, throw
open their “mandates” to public discussion and scrutiny, and invite a national discussion
about the REAL threats to democracy and human rights posed by government and
corporations.
Part of such a discussion could begin with a serious examination
of our own language in discussing these issues, one that would help us better
frame our relationship to the state and point to future paths of resistance. As
Noam Chomsky declared in a 1971 discussion with French philosopher Michel
Foucault, “We should stop allowing
illegitimate powers to define what is legal.…the state has the power to
enforce a certain concept of what is legal, but power doesn't imply justice or
even correctness…
“For example, in the United
States, the state defines it as civil disobedience to, let’s say, derail an
ammunition train that’s going to Vietnam, and the state is wrong in defining
that as civil disobedience, because it’s legal and proper and should be done.
It’s proper to carry out actions that will prevent the criminal acts of the
state, just as it is proper to violate a traffic ordinance in order to prevent
a murder…. A good deal of what the state authorities define as civil
disobedience is not really civil disobedience: in fact, it’s legal, obligatory
behaviour in violation of the commands of the state, which may or may not be legal
commands. … Just because the criminal happens to call your action illegal when
you try to stop him, it doesn't mean it is illegal.”
Following 9/11/2001,
activists huddled in groups and asked themselves: what’s next? The best answer I
heard came from the now 95-year-old pacifist Frank Showler of Toronto, who
reminded one church group that all through the Bible, there is a pretty
consistent message that we can all take heart from: Be not afraid. And so
perhaps a very good response to Bill C-51 is to declare that its potential
passage will not deter, censor us, or make us back down: we will unashamedly continue
our work for justice, our solidarity with those unjustly tageted, and our
loving resistance to the criminal actions of this government and its agencies.